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Abstract
We propose an approach to restricting the set of equilibria in a market game and use
it to assess the robustness of the price dispersion results obtained by Koutsougeras
[2003, J. Econ. Theory 108, 169–175] in the multiple trading posts setup. More
precisely, we perturb the initial game by the introduction of transaction costs and
our main results are the following. (i) No equilibrium with price dispersion of
the game with costless transactions can be approached by equilibria with positive
transaction costs as costs get arbitrarily small. (ii) When this type of perturbation
is considered the set of equilibrium outcomes is not affected by the number of
trading posts. In addition, the analysis hints at conditions required for non-zero
transaction costs to serve as a source of price dispersion in this class of exchange
economies.
JEL Classification: C72, D43, D50.
Keywords: Strategic market games, law of one price, perturbed games, equilibrium
refinement.
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1. Introduction
General equilibrium theory provides an analysis of how markets work under per-
fect, price taking competition. Underlying perfect competition is the idea that agents
take advantage of profitable exchange opportunities, leading in particular homogeneous
goods to be traded at the same market price (the so-called ‘law of one price’). Given
the centrality of this “law” in economic theory, a large body of theoretical research has
emerged to identify the conditions required for price uniformity, or symmetricaly, ex-
plaining persistent price dispersion. The literature has shown in particular that price
uniformity may fail in the presence of information, or search costs (e.g., [35, 45, 8]).
More recently Koutsougeras [23] showed that absent such frictions the mere existence
of multiple trading-posts may give rise to equilibrium price dispersion. This stems
from imperfect competition when traders internalize the price impact of their trade,
preventing them to take advantage from arbitrage opportunities across markets.
One may ask whether this result implies that the law of one price cannot (reason-
ably) be justified—and thus imposed a priori—in organized but imperfectly competitive
markets. To address this question, we offer a discussion of price uniformity (or lack
thereoff) in economies where imperfect competition is the sole departure from the wal-
rasian benchmark. Precisely, we consider the recent extension of the strategic market
games approach initiated by ([40, 41]) to multiple markets ([6, 5, 23, 24]) and propose a
natural robustness requirement for this class of trading games. We use this requirement
to qualify the recent results about equilibrium price dispersion ([5, 23]) and eventually
provide some support for the law of one price. The gist of our analysis is that the
(possible) failure of the law of one price as well as related properties of the multiple
posts setup are not immune to the introduction of arbitrarily small transaction costs.
Before explaining our approach further, it may be useful to give some intuition as to
why a grain of transaction costs can restore price uniformity. In the original game with
costless trade, agents can place ‘wash-sales’ trades, that is bids and offers that cancel
each other on a same trading post. Although such trades matter for strategic equilibria
because they affect the relative thickness of trading posts, any agent is indifferent as to
the amount of his own wash-sales [see 32,31]. In other words, fixing others’ strategies,
an agent’s allocation only depends on his net trades. With strictly positive transaction
costs, agents also care about their gross trades, and never choose to be active on both
sides of a given post. In the limit when transaction costs vanish, this leads to the
selection—among the best response strategies—of the unique strategy minimizing gross
trade, that is that without wash-sales. With multiple trading posts, wash-sales allow
for equilibrium price dispersion as an agent’s attempt to lower his bid on the expensive
post may adversely impact his sales on this same post.1 Hence, only equilibria satisfying
1This is related to Bloch and Ferrer [5, prop. 9] who show in a specific model that the law of one
price holds when wash-sales are precluded. We discuss in more details our contribution compared to
theirs in section 1.1.
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the law of one price survive the introduction of small transaction costs.
Our robustness approach rests on the idea that the assumption of costless trade is
a simplification. In particular, a property that would not hold—even approximately—
once arbitrarily small transaction costs are explicitly modeled may be viewed as artifi-
cial. Following this line of reasoning, we perturb the initial game by the introduction
of (a simple form of) transaction costs and state in our main result that no equilibrium
with price dispersion of the game with costless transactions can be approached by equi-
libria with positive transaction costs as costs get arbitrarily small—in short, we say that
such an equilibrium is not “robust”. We also show that the set of robust outcomes—viz,
those associated with robust equilibria—does not depend on the number of trading
posts.
For tractability, we first derive our results under the assumption that transaction
costs are linear in the amount of goods sent to the market. This specification follows
[36], who introduce transaction costs in the bid-offer market game of [15]. While [36]
focus on the issue of the existence of an equilibrium with active trade when transaction
costs are not too prohibitive, we use transaction costs to define perturbed games and
to reduce the set of equilibria. The assumption of proportional transaction costs is
convenient and usual in the modeling of exchange economies,2 and allows us to make
our point in the most transparent way. Further, for the type of market games under
study, it may be viewed as a property of some costs associated with monetary exchange,
such as the opportunity cost of money holdings or the interest paid on borrowed money.
One noteworthy implication of the linear specification is the law of one price holds even
with non-zero transaction costs.
We consider more general specifications in section 4, and show that our main mes-
sage extends to relatively general transaction cost functions, including some fixed cost
specification. Formally, we identify conditions that are sufficient and tight to elimi-
nate wash-sales trade and restore price uniformity in the limit. Essentially, what is
required is that agents perceive a cost from simultaneously buying the same good in
the same market place at the same price, which seems a reasonable characterization of
many trade activities. Note however that, even though price uniformity obtains in the
limit, our general specification leaves room for transaction costs themselves to induce
price dispersion by affecting arbitrage strategies. Here, our analysis of the perturbed
games suggests conditions that are necessary for transaction costs to serve as a sepa-
rate source of dispersion. Namely, trading costs should not depend only on the total
quantity traded per good, and should affect both sellers and buyers.
Most of our results are presented for the inside money case, in which agents are
not constrained by initial money holdings. To emphasize the critical role of wash-
sales we show in section 3 that our basic results also hold for the commodity money
variant, which shows that binding liquidity constraints do not induce price dispersion
2See e.g. [21, 2] in general equilibrium theory, [11, 46] in financial economics, or Samuelson’s
“iceberg cost” specification in international trade theory [39, 26].
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in monetary market games.3 Further, to better clarify the connection between wash-
sales and price dispersion we provide in section 4 an example showing that wash-sales
on one side of the market (e.g. by net buyers only) are sufficient for price dispersion,
and show that the elimination of wash-sales on only one trading post is sufficient to
induce uniform prices. In that section, we also consider additional perturbations (such
as ε-NE and complexity costs) and discuss how price dispersion in the limit relates to
the relative importance of the different pertubations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section
we discuss the related literature. In section 2 we introduce the framework and some
definitions. Our main results are presented in section 3, under a linear transaction costs
specification. The analysis is extended to more general transaction costs functions in
section 4, while section 5 further discusses the generality of our robustness approach.
Section 6 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to an appendix.
1.1. Relation to the literature
From a broad perspective, this paper contributes to the non-cooperative approach to
market economies. One approach, which nicely captures aspects of relatively decentral-
ized economies in which matching frictions are of primary importance, is to depict trade
in markets between agents who meet randomly and agree on pairwise specific prices.
This modelling strategy has been applied—among other things—to discuss the strategic
foundations of the perfect competitive outcome in general exchange economies with a
continuum of traders (see the monographs by [29, 17], and also [28, 27]). In contrast,
we follow the strategic market game tradition where trade is mediated by independent
and organized clearing markets.4 As in [5, 23], agents can trade a given good on dif-
ferent trading posts, potentialy at different prices. In a related setting, [6] analyze the
incentives of trading groups to form separate markets, under the restriction that no
agent participates to more than one market.
With unrestricted participation, [25, 23] show that price dispersion can be sustained
in equilibrium when the number of agents is finite. This is analyzed further in [24], who
shows that price dispersion comes with real effects, and in [5], who show that generically
prices are different on different trading posts. [24] further shows that the law of one price
does not fail drastically as the number of agents goes to infinity, provided that no agent
is constrained by his endowment. This set of results suggests that the canonical market
game where agents are assumed to trade on a single market at a single price is not
3Such constraints can still generate (robust) price dispersion in the market game with multilateral
trade of [1], as their example 1 (p. 139) does not involve wash-sales.
4We take the view that the diversity of non walrasian frameworks is partly a reflection of the
diversity of real markets—some markets (e.g. stock markets or markets for agricultural goods) being
more centralized and organized than others (e.g. markets for restaurant or some labor markets).
The different approaches are thus complementary in increasing our understanding of the way markets
work. More related to our point, these different frameworks may also lead to different notions of
‘market power’.
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theoretically justified, and should be replaced by the (more general) multiple trading
post variant. In contrast we offer a justification for the one price assumption even with
finite agents, and our irrelevance result suggests that there is no loss of generality in
working with the single trading post market game.
In this literature, our work is mostly related to Bloch and Ferrer [5]. One contribu-
tion of our paper is to show that the failure of the law of one price identified in [25, 23]
has its source not in market power per se, but in the fact that agents buy and sell a com-
modity on the same market and at the same price. Relatedly, [5] consider limited setup
with two goods for which they can fully work with first order conditions, and derive the
law of one price for the case of corner endowments and the Buy-or-Sell specification—
that is, cases in which agents cannot play wash-sales. However, they impose strong
assumptions on utility functions,5 and implicitely restrict attention to equilibria with
non binding endowments constraints—a restriction which in light of the examples in
[1] and [24, section 4] is not innocuous for price dispersion. Compared to theirs, our
contribution is twofold. Firstly, we neatly identify the connection between wash-sales
and the failure of the law of one price and show that wash-sales are the critical source
of price dispersion in any monetary (with commodity or inside money) market games.
This holds true even if (some) agents have linear preferences, or in the case of binding
endowments constraints. The former case is noteworthy, as the literature has shown
that linear market games economies exhibit peculiar properties (e.g. [12]). Regarding
the latter, we also derive our main results for the commodity money market game, in
which agents’ trading strategies are constrained by their money holding. Our results
therefore show that binding liquidity constraints (in money or commodities) do not in-
duce price dispersion in monetary market games. Our section 4 also contains additional
results on the intimate connection between wash-sales and price dispersion. Second, we
provide a rationale for the Buy-or-Sell specification assumed in [5]. This is more than
a technical microfoundation as, from an abstract standpoint, one may argue that the
usual, Buy-and-Sell model is more general in that it places fiewer restrictions on agents
behavior.6 To be sure, we are aware of no other attempt to rationalize the Buy-or-Sell
version, with the exception of [30] who provides conditions for consumers to be active
on one side of the market in a large market game with demand uncertainty.
We argue that ‘good’ equilibria in strategic market games should be robust to arbi-
trarily small transaction costs. By eliminating the indeterminacy of best replies asso-
ciated with wash-sales, this argument cuts down one source of the multiplicity of Nash
equilibria in market games.7 Our approach differs from previous works on equilibrium
5[5] assume that for any agent h, the utility function uh is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
and satisfies the boundary conditions limxi→0
∂uh
∂xi
= +∞, where xi is h’s consumption of good i.
6Shapley and Shubik [41] note that although situtations without wash-sales seem more ‘realistic’
it is not obvious how the restriction can be implemented with anonymous agents, since an agent could
allways ‘split’ himself and disguise his trades. This type of behavior would not arise in our setting
since with small transaction costs agents have strictly no incentives to buy and sell on a same post.
7See the formal analyses in [14, 31]. In the context of a market game with a continuum of players,
[30] shows that the multiplicity of best responses disappears with demand uncertainty. The underlying
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notions in strategic market games (e.g., [15, 12, 9, 47]), that focus exclusively on the
problem of ‘no trade’ at some posts. Following [15], one popular approach has been
to consider equilibria obtained as the limit of perturbed games in which some outside
agency places vanishingly small bids and offers on each trading post. More recently,
[16] use some strong notion of evolutionary stability to rule out equilibria in which some
markets are inactive. Instead, our criterion applies to equilibria with active trade.
It is also instructive to relate this paper to the recent literature on complexity
and dynamic bargaining games ([38, 19, 10]). In particular, Sabourian [38] and Gale
and Sabourian [19] use complexity costs to select competivive outcomes in a class of
decentralized markets with a finite number of agents. While the underlying reasons
for multiplicity are clearly different, we also use small costs to select strategies, and
equilibria, with attractive features. Besides, one may also argue that strategies with
wash-sales might be pruned by complexity considerations. To be precise, consider two
strategies that differ only in that the latter implies more market orders (say, a buy
and a sell) than the former (say, only a buy order). Then, the latter might be viewed
as more ‘complex’, and eliminated by small complexity costs. This (weak) ordering of
strategies would suffice to obtain our results (see the discussion in section 4).
Lastly, our work is related to the literature explaining price dispersion in homo-
geneous markets. Following Stigler [44], many models have been introduced in which
price dispersion arises because of limited information or costly consumer search. With
ex ante identical agents, different prices can emerge in equilibrium in costly, noisy
search environments where consumers may observe more than one price, as first shown
by [8], and in directed search models where workers search on the job ([13]) or simulta-
neously apply to multiple firms ([20]). Price dispersion can also arise when information
about prices is mediated by a central ‘clearing house’, if not all consumers ([45]), or
firms ([3]), access the clearing house. These contributions emphasize the role of lim-
ited information or matching frictions.8 In constrast, our research question is whether
imperfect competition (in the sense of departure from price taking) alone can result
in price dispersion. In a classical complete information, general-equilibrium model of
imperfect competition, we show that this can only arise under extreme assumptions on
transaction costs. This suggests that price dispersion is much more likely explained by
limitation on information or rationality.
2. General setting and definitions
To fix ideas, we present our analysis for the multiple trading posts extension of
the inside money market game of [32], and cover the commodity money case as an
extension.
reason differs from ours, as ‘wash-sales’ cannot be defined in his setup with uncertainty.
8More recently, contributions have also emphasized the potential of bounded rationality [4, 43] or
belief heterogeneity [34] in explaining dispersion.
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We consider an exchange economy with a finite set H of agents, indexed by h =
1, ...,H, and L + 1 goods, indexed by i = 1, ..., L + 1, where good L + 1 represents
money. Each agent h ∈ H has endowment eh ∈ IRL+, and preferences described by a
utility function uh : IRL+ −→ IR+ defined over consumption bundles. We require uh to
be continuous, strictly increasing in the consumption of goods 1, . . . , L.9 Good L + 1
is an inside money with no direct utility. Agents have no initial money endowment,
but can issue inside money at no cost. To avoid over issuance, it is postulated that an
agent that goes bankrupt—that is whose (monetary) gains from sales do not cover his
bids—has all his bids and offers confiscated (see [31] for a discussion).
Trade is organized as follows. For any commodity i = 1, ..., L, there are Ki ≥ 1
trading posts where good i is exchanged for money (good L + 1). Trading posts are
indexed by (i, s), where s = 1, ...,Ki. We let K denote the set of trading posts in the
economy, and K =
∑L
i=1K
i the aggregate number of trading posts.
An agent’s strategy, σh, specifies for each trading post a non negative offer of com-
modity, qi,sh , and a non negative bid in term of money, b
i,s
h . Let Sh denote the strategy
set of agent h, and S = S1 × . . .× SH the set of strategy profiles, with generic element
σ = (σh)h∈H. To single out the strategy of a given agent h, we will sometimes write
the strategy profile as (σh, σ−h).
Given a strategy profile σ ∈ S, define
Bi,s =
∑
H
bi,sh and Q
i,s =
∑
H
qi,sh ,
and, for a given h ∈ H,
Bi,sh =
∑
H\{h}
bi,sh′ and Q
i,s
h =
∑
H\{h}
qi,sh′ .
On trading post (i, s), prices are formed according to the standard Shapley-Shubik
rule:
pi,s =
{
Bi,s/Qi,s if Qi,s 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Subsequently we use the convention 1/pi,s = 0 whenever pi,s = 0.
We follow Rogawski and Shubik [36] in modeling transaction costs as consuming
part of the commodities offered in transaction. Further, to state our results in the
most transparent way, we first restrict ourselves to the following linear iceberg cost
specification. When a quantity q of commodity i ∈ {1, ..., L} is offered on post (i, s),
an additional quantity η · q (η ≥ 0) is needed in order to place this offer (a fraction of
the good is ‘lost in transaction’). We consider more general specifications in section 4.
However, we view this simple specification as a natural starting point for two reasons.
(i) Our formulation is in the spirit of the Shapley-Shubik approach in that it preserves
9The assumption that uh is strictly increasing in all goods 1, . . . , L is made to simplify the ex-
position. We can relax it to: “uh is non decreasing in all its arguments (i.e. final consumption of
commodities 1, . . . , L+ 1) and strictly increasing in at least one argument”.
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the independance of trading posts. (ii) It captures in the simplest way the idea that
many costs incurred in transacting increase with the volume of trade. This is true
for some direct costs associated with the distribution of goods, such as transportation,
storage or packaging costs, but also—and more importantly—for costs associated with
monetary exchange such as the opportunity cost of money holdings, or interest rate
paid on borrowed money.
Given this specification, agent h chooses his strategy σh in the set10
Sh =
{(
bi,sh , q
i,s
h
)
∈ IR2K+ |
Ki∑
s=1
(
qi,sh + ηq
i,s
h
)
≤ eih
}
,
and, given others’ strategies, does not go bankrupt whenever
Dh (σh, σ−h) :=
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh −
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
qi,sh p
i,s ≤ 0. (2)
Final allocations are then determined as follows:
xih (σ) =

eih −
Ki∑
s=1
(1 + η) qi,sh +
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh /p
i,s if (2) holds,
eih −
Ki∑
s=1
(1 + η) qi,sh otherwise.
(3)
It easily follows from (3) that (2) holds with equality at the optimum for h.
The case η = 0 corresponds to the game analysed in [23]. We will refer to this as
the initial game, Γ, and to the game with η > 0 as Γη.
The rest of this section is devoted to the formal statement of the law of one price,
and to our robustness requirement.
Definition 1. A trading post (i, s) is active if pi,s > 0, or equivalently Bi,s > 0 and
Qi,s > 0.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ ∈ S satisfies the law of one price (LOP) if it induces,
for any good i = 1, . . . , L, prices that are uniform across active trading-posts:(
pi,spi,r > 0 =⇒ pi,s = pi,r) ∀ i, r, s.
We say that a Nash equilibrium of the initial game is robust if it can be approached
by equilibria of the perturbed games with strictly positive transaction costs as trans-
action costs vanish. Formally,
Definition 3. A Nash equilibrium σ of the game Γ is “robust” if there exists a sequence
{nη,n σ}∞n=1 where nη ∈ IR+ and nσ (∈ S) is a NE of the perturbed games Γnη such that
limn→∞ nη = 0 and limn→∞ nσ = σ.
10To ease the exposition, we do not write Sηh for the strategy set although it does depend on η.
Note that strategy sets for any η > 0 are included into strategy sets for η = 0, so that any equilibria
belongs to this larger set, S01 × · · · × S0H . No confusion should result.
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Finally, we also introduce the set of strategies for which h is not simulatenously
active on both sides of a given trading post:
S¯h := Sh ∩
{(
bi,sh , q
i,s
h
)
∈ IR2K+ | bi,sh .qi,sh = 0 ∀ (i, s) ∈ K
}
.
The corresponding set of strategy profiles is S¯ := S¯1 × . . .× S¯H .
3. The linear case
This section presents our main results using the above linear iceberg cost specifica-
tion. We analyse the game with strictly positive transaction costs in section 3.1, and
present the robustness results in section 3.2. Section 3.3 shows that these results extend
to the game with outside money.
3.1. The perturbed games
We start with one important intermediate result stating that when η > 0 it is never
a best reply to buy and sell on the same trading post.
Lemma 1. Let η > 0. Any individual best reply in Γη satisfies σh ∈ S¯h.
Proof. Assume the contrary, viz that there exist a post (i, s) such that bi,sh > 0 and
qi,sh > 0 for a candidate best reply σh. We construct a profitable deviation σˆh by
subtracting a small amount of wash-sales (conveniently defined) on that post (i, s).
Formally, for δ > 0 consider the deviation with qˆi,sh = q
i,s
h − δ and bˆi,sh = bi,sh − δpi,s. As
bi,sh · qi,sh > 0 and σh ∈ Sh, we can choose δ > 0 (small enough) such that σˆh ∈ Sh. Now,
substituting σˆh for σh affects neither prices nor the (net) commodity bundle obtained
through trading.11 To see that pˆi,s = pi,s note that the initial price pi,s is defined by
pi,s
(
Qi,sh + q
i,s
h
)
= Bi,sh + b
i,s
h . (4)
Substracting δpi,s from both sides and rearranging yields
pi,s
(
Qi,sh + q
i,s
h − δ
)
= Bi,sh + b
i,s
h − δpi,s, (5)
and, eventually pi,s = B
i,s
h +bˆ
i,s
h
Qi,sh +qˆ
i,s
h
= pˆi,s. Further, the agent net trade is unaffected as
bˆi,sh
pˆi,s
− qˆi,sh =
bi,sh − δpi,s
pi,s
−
(
qi,sh − δ
)
=
bi,sh
pi,s
− qi,sh . (6)
Now, straightforward manipulations show that Dh (σˆh, σ−h) = Dh (σh, σ−h), implying
that σˆh satisfies (2) and is admissible. Furthermore, by playing σˆh, agent h gets the
same allocation xjh (σˆh, σ−h) = x
j
h (σh, σ−h) for all goods j 6= i, and xih (σˆh, σ−h) =
xjh (σh, σ−h) + ηδ > x
j
h (σh, σ−h). The contradiction follows.
11In that sense, (bi,sh − bˆi,sh , qi,sh − qˆi,sh ) are ’wash-sales’ trades.
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When η = 0, the proof of lemma 1 states the standard result that agent h can
obtain his preferred consumption bundle through a continuum of best reply strategies
parameterized by the amount of wash-sales (see [32, 31]). By contrast, when η > 0,
agents seek to minimize their gross trades and (endogenously) choose to be active on
only one side of a given trading post.
The next result shows that the law of one price cannot be violated when transaction
costs are positive.
Proposition 1. Let η > 0. Any equilibrium of the market game Γη satisfies the law of
one price.
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1. We first show that in a candidate
equilibrium of Γη with pi,s > pi,r > 0, it must hold that
Bi,sh
Bi,sh + b
i,s
h
>
Bi,rh
Bi,rh + b
i,r
h
∀h ∈ B (i, s) , (7)
where B (i, s) :=
{
h ∈ H | bi,sh > 0
}
denotes the set of (equilibrium) bidders on post
(i, s). The proof is by contradiction. Consider h ∈ B (i, s) such that
Bi,sh
Bi,sh + b
i,s
h
≤ B
i,r
h
Bi,rh + b
i,r
h
. (8)
First note that qi,sh = 0 by lemma 1. We consider a deviation shifting a small amount
of money from (i, s) to (i, r). For η > 0, consider the deviation σˆh defined by the
substitution of bˆi,sh = b
i,s
h − η and bˆi,rh = bi,rh + η for bi,sh and bi,rh in σh. This is well
defined for η > 0 small enough, because bi,sh > 0. We first check that σˆh satisfies the no
bankruptcy condition Dh (σˆh, σ−h) ≤ 0. By the definition of equilibrium, we have that
Dh (σh, σ−h) = 0. Using qˆ
i,s
h = q
i,s
h = 0 and qˆ
i,r
h = q
i,r
h , straightforward manipulation
then yields
Dh (σˆh, σ−h) = Dh (σh, σ−h) + q
i,r
h
(
pi,r − pˆi,r) . (9)
Now,
pi,r − pˆi,r = B
i,r
h + b
i,r
h
Qi,r
− B
i,r
h + bˆ
i,r
h
Qi,r
=
bi,rh − bˆi,rh
Qi,r
= − η
Qi,r
< 0 (10)
so that Dh (σˆh, σ−h) < 0. It remains to show that this admissible deviation (for η small
enough) is indeed preferred by h. First note that final consumption for good j 6= i
remains unchanged. Define xˆih (η) := x
j
h (σˆh (η) , σ−h). Clearly xˆ
i
h (0) = x
i
h (σh, σ−h),
the (putative) equilibrium consumption. Furthermore,
dxˆih(η)
dη |η=0+ = −
∂xih(.)
∂bi,sh
+ ∂x
i
h(.)
∂bi,rh
= − Qi,s
bi,sh +B
i,s
h
Bi,sh
Bi,sh +b
i,s
h
+ Q
i,r
bi,rh +B
i,r
h
Bi,rh
Bi,rh +b
i,r
h
= − B
i,s
h
bi,sh +B
i,s
h
1
pi,s
+ B
i,r
h
bi,rh +B
i,r
h
1
pi,r
.
It easily follows from pi,s > pi,r and (8) that this is strictly positive, so that for η small
enough uh (σˆh, σ−h) > uh (σh, σ−h) , contradicting the assumption that σh is a best
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reply. Step 2. Now, assume that an equilibrium of Γη violates the law of one price,
that is there exist i, s and r such that pi,s > pi,r > 0. First note that, by (7), bi,sh > 0
implies bi,rh > 0, so that B (i, s) ⊆ B (i, r). Now,
H − 1 = ∑
H
Bi,sh
Bi,s
=
∑
B(i,s)
Bi,sh
Bi,s
+
∑
H\B(i,s)
1
>
∑
B(i,s)
Bi,rh
Bi,r
+
∑
H\B(i,s)
1 ≥ ∑
B(i,r)
Bi,rh
Bi,r
+
∑
H\B(i,r)
1 = H − 1.
where the first inequality comes from (7). A contradiction.
3.2. Robustness results
We are now ready to state our (non-)robustness results. Our first main result shows
that the law of one price holds for any robust equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Price dispersion is not a robust property. More precisely if an equilibrium
of Γ features price dispersion, then it is not robust.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume there exists a robust equilibrium ∗σ of Γ
with dispersed prices. By failure of the LOP, there exist i, s and r such that
∗pi,s =
∗Bi,s
∗Qi,s
>∗ pi,r =
∗Bi,r
∗Qi,r
> 0. (11)
By robustness, there exists a sequence {nσ}∞n=1 of equilibria of perturbed games with
vanishing costs such that nσ →∗ σ, implying in particular
lim
n→∞
nBi,s
nQi,s
=
∗Bi,s
∗Qi,s
and lim
n→∞
nBi,r
nQi,r
=
∗Bi,r
∗Qi,r
. (12)
Now, proposition 1 implies that
nBi,s
nQi,s
=
nBi,r
nQi,r
∀n. By unicity of the limit, we have
that limn→∞
nBi,s
nQi,s
= limn→∞
nBi,r
nQi,r
, which is in contradiction with (11).
The example in [23] shows that price uniformity is not a (necessary) property of
equilibria for the economy in the limit, Γ. In contrast, theorem 2 states that price
uniformity does hold for the limit economy obtained as transaction costs vanish.12
We now turn to our second main result, stating that the set of robust equilibrium
allocations—viz, allocations associated with robust equilibria—does not depend on the
number of trading posts. This investigation is motivated by the analysis in [24] indicat-
ing that the set of equilibrium outcomes expands as the number of posts is increased.
Theorem 3. Provided that Ki ≥ 1, the number of trading posts is irrelevant for robust
allocations.
12See Gale [18] for the discussion of ‘the economy in the limit’ and ‘the limit economy’.
12
Proof. See the appendix.
Remark 1. Proposition 5 and 6 in [24] assert the equivalence for interior equilibria13
between equilibrium allocations of the one trading post setup and uniform prices alloca-
tions of the multiple trading post setup. Given theorem 2 above, this suggests theorem
3. Note however that this is not sufficient to show the result. First, robust equilibria
are not interior (lemma 1). Secondly, we need to check that the robustness property is
not affected by the number of trading posts.
Finally, note that not all “uniform price” equilibria are robust. Intuitively, only those
equilibria where agents do not place wash sales trades may be immune to our robustness
requirement. The general implication of our robustness test on the structure of the set
of equilibria of the single trading post setup is beyond the scope of this paper, though.
Here, we simply state the following:
Proposition 4. Let σ∗ be a robust equilibrium. Then σ∗ ∈ S¯. Furthermore, there is no
agent that buys and sells a same good (on different posts) at σ∗.
Proof. We first show that σ∗ ∈ S¯. First note that only relative bids matter in equilib-
rium, so that we can consider w.l.o.g. equilibria with normalized bids, in the set
S0 :=
(bi,sh , qi,sh ) ∈ IR2KH+ |
K′i∑
s=1
qi,sh ≤ eih ∀i ∀h,
∑
h,i,s
bi,sh ≤ 1
 .
The set of normalized strategy profiles without wash sales, S¯0 := S0 ∩ S¯, is a closed
subset of S¯. Now consider a converging sequence nσ → σ. Lemma 1 implies that
nσ ∈ S¯0 ∀n. As S¯0 is closed, we have σ ∈ S¯0. We now show the second part. Assume
that there exists h ∈ H and two active posts i, s for good i such that bi,rh > 0 and qi,sh > 0.
By the robustness of σ∗, we have bi,rh = q
i,s
h = 0 and p
i,r = pi,s. Now, let x+h ≡
bi,rh
pi,r
−qi,sh
and assume that, say, x+h ≥ 0. (the opposite case is similar). The quantity x+h is the net
contribution of h’s trades on these two trading posts to his equilibrium consumption.
This net trade is covered by a quantity of money m+h ≡ pi,rx+h > 0 obtained from trades
in all remaining markets. Consider the strategy σˆh obtained from σ∗h by setting qˆ
i,s
h = 0
and bˆi,rh = m
+
h . This strategy is feasible, and leaves h’s budget position unaltered since
it only affects prices on posts (i, r) and (i, s). Now, bˆi,rh < b
i,r
h implies that pˆ
i,r < pi,r,
and thus bˆi,rh /pˆ
i,r > x+h . Hence, σˆh implements extra consumption compared to the
equilibrium strategy σ∗h. A contradiction.
3.3. The market game with commodity money
In this section, we show that our results extend to the multiple post extension of
the market game with commodity money of Dubey and Shubik [15]. There are two
13An equilibrium is interior if all traders submit strictly positive bids and offers on all posts.
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reasons to this analysis. First, equilibrium price dispersion can arise in this setup too
([25]). Secondly, given that the distinctive feature of this framework lies in the presence
of (money) liquidity constraints, one might expect price dispersion to obtain under
weaker conditions. We show that this is not the case.
Let Γ′denote the game with commodity money and no transaction costs, and Γ′η
denote the game with a given η > 0. We only describe the differences with the inside
money case. Good L + 1 is an outside commodity money that may enter utility. Any
agent h ∈ H has an initial money endowment, eL+1h ≥ 0, that limits his bidding capacity.
Agent h’s strategy space is thus:
Sh =
{(
bi,sh , q
i,s
h
)
∈ IR2K+ |
Ki∑
s=1
(1 + η) qi,sh ≤ eih,
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh ≤ eL+1h
}
.
Final allocations are determined for any commodity i ∈ {1, .., L} by
xih (σ) = e
i
h − (1 + η)
Ki∑
s=1
qi,sh +
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh /p
i,s, (13)
and, for the L+ 1th commodity (money), by:
xL+1h (σ) = e
L+1
h −
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
bi,sh +
L∑
i=1
Ki∑
s=1
qi,sh p
i,s. (14)
To show that our results extend in a straightforward way to Γ′, it is useful to rewrite
final money holdings (14) as
xL+1h (σh, σ−h) = e
L+1
h −Dh (σh, σ−h) , (15)
with Dh (σh, σ−h) introduced in (2). The main building blocks of the previous analysis
can then be easily adapted:
Lemma 2. Let η > 0. Any individual best reply in Γ′η satisfies σh ∈ S¯h.
Proof. Consider the deviation in the proof of lemma 1. It satisfies the liquidity con-
straint because it reduces the agent’s aggregate bids. Further, the consumption of
money is unaffected, xˆL+1h = x
L+1
h (σh, σ−h) because Dh (σˆh, σ−h) = Dh (σh, σ−h) by
the definition of wash-sales. The proof follows.
Proposition 5. Let η > 0. Any equilibrium of Γ′η satisfies the law of one price.
Proof. We simply need to check step 1 in the proof of proposition 1, that is to show that
condition (7) holds∀h ∈ B (i, s) for a candidate equilibrium in which pi,s > pi,r > 0.
The deviation σˆh in the proof of proposition 1 amounts to shifting a small quantity of
money from one post to another. Thus, σˆh satisfies the liquidity constraint because the
amount of bids is unchanged. Further, xL+1h (σˆh, σ−h)−xL+1h (σh, σ−h) = Dh (σh, σ−h)−
Dh (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 0 by (9) and (10). Step 1 and the proof follows.
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Other proofs are (almost) unaffected. In particular, we have:
Theorem 6. If an equilibrium of Γ′ features price dispersion, then it is not robust.
Theorem 7. The set of robust allocations for Γ′ is independent of the number of trading
posts (provided that Ki ≥ 1).
The fact that we obtain similar results for the market game with money liquidity
constraints of Dubey and Shubik [15] and for that with perfect costless inside money
of Postlewaite and Schmeidler [32] suggests the following observations. First, the price
dispersion results illustrated in [23] for the latter framework and in [25] for the former
have the very same source (namely, wash sales). Secondly, the existence of money
liquidity constraints per se does not induce price dispersion in this framework. The
intuition for this hinges on the assumption that there is a unique means of transaction
(money). Hence, although the trading structure allows for one good to be purchased
or sold on different locations—and potentially at different prices—there is only one
way to transact. This amounts to assuming an upper bound on the degree of price
inconsistency. It is is worth mentioning that the price dispersion result of Amir et al.
[1], which is of a different nature, should not be affected by our perturbations.
4. Generalized transaction costs
We now generalize the specification of transaction costs and identify tight sufficient
conditions for our main result to hold. In particular, we show that our analysis can
incorporate some form of non convexities, and discuss fixed costs specifications. Further,
we study the extent to which strictly positive transaction costs may lead to equilibrium
price dispersion in this setup.
Our initial specification exhibits several features. (i) Transaction costs are paid in
commodities—some goods are simply ‘lost in transaction’. (ii) Costs are only paid by
sellers and, (iii) they are linear. Note that these assumptions embed two conceptually
distinct issues: how transaction costs are paid (commodity, money or ‘time’), and how
they depend on the agent’s gross position (bid and offer) on the market.
Assumption (i) is made to simplify the exposition. In particular, we could consider
the alternative—and seemingly more natural—case of monetary costs, but this would
require the introduction of additional details that would only obscure our point.14 To
discuss the importance of (ii) and (iii), we assume in this section that transaction
costs are paid in utility terms. This is harmless, given our focus on arbitrarily small
costs. In line with the market game approach, we maintain the assumption that costs
are independent between trading posts. Hence, we consider a general function c :
R2+ −→ R+ such that c (b, q) ≥ 0 represents the (normalized) transaction cost borne
14E.g., for the inside money case, if part of the transaction costs is paid in money, one has to
introduce a modelling device to redistribute (directly or through the market) the monetary cost so
that agents do not go bankrupt in equilibrium. This is not needed for the commodity money case.
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when posting (b, q) on a given trading post. Given the interpretation, it is natural to
assume that no cost is incurred when the agent does not participate to the trading post
(c (0, 0) = 0), and to restrict attention to non decreasing functions.15 Also given the
focus on negligible transaction costs, we assume that c takes finite values in the sense
that c (b, q) <∞ if b <∞ and q <∞. We denote by C the set of such transaction costs
functions. To make explicit the dependence on c in the limiting argument, we refer in
this section to ‘c-robust’ equilibria, and use the notation Γηc for the perturbed games.
For general costs functions, the key property required to single out strategies without
wash sales is:
Assumption (A1). ∀ (b, q) > (0, 0), ∀ (b′, q′) 6= (0, 0) with (b′, q′) < (b, q) it holds that
c (b, q) > c (0, q′) and c (b, q) > c (b′, 0) .
Lemma 3. Fix c ∈ C. If assumption (A1) holds, then ∀η > 0 any individual best reply
in Γηc satisfies b
i,s
h · qi,sh = 0.
Proof. 3 Assume the contrary, that is ∃σ ∈ NE (Γηc) such that ∃h, i, k with bi,kh .qi,kh > 0.
We distinguish two cases, depending on whether bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh ≥ 0 or bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh < 0.
We consider only the former case (the reasoning for the latter case is analogous). Given
that h is a net buyer on post (i, k), he can obtain the same allocation by altering his
strategy on this post such that
(
b′i,kh , q
′i,k
h
)
=
(
bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh , 0
)
. The transaction cost
on post (i, k) associated with this strategy is c
(
bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh , 0
)
. By optimality σ′h
cannot be preferred to σh, wich in turn implies that c
(
bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh , 0
)
= c
(
bi,kh , q
i,k
h
)
.
Now, by assumption 4 for b = bi,kh , q = q
i,k
h and b
′ = bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh it must hold that
c
(
bi,kh , q
i,k
h
)
> c
(
bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh , 0
)
. A contradiction.
Assumption (A1) is in our view a weak condition, and is satisfied by many usual
specifications (we discuss some of them below). For the moment, let us simply mention
that it is satisfied if c is strictly increasing in at least one argument, or if agents incur
a fixed cost on each side of a trading post.
4.1. Robust equilibria
We now study the robust properties of Γ under (A1). We first show that our main
result easily extends to transaction costs function satisfying this property.
Proposition 8. Consider a transaction cost function c ∈ C that satisfies (A1). Then
any c-robust equilibrium of Γ satisfies the law of one price.
Proof. Let ∗σ be a c-robust NE of Γ. Then there exists a sequence {nη,n σ}∞n=1 such
that nη → 0, nσ →∗ σ, nη > 0 ∀n ∈ N and nσ is a NE of the perturbed game Γnηc. By
15Formally, whenever (q′, b′) > (q, b) (where ‘>’ is understood component-wise), we have c (q′, b) ≥
c (q, b) and c (q′, b) ≥ c (q, b).
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lemma 3 we have that nbi,sh ·n qi,sh = 0 ∀n ∈ N, ∀i, s, h. This implies that ∗bi,sh ·∗ qi,sh = 0
∀i, s, h, because nbi,sh ·n qi,sh →∗ bi,sh ·∗ qi,sh . Now, the argument in the proof of proposition
1 can be used to show that ∗σ must satisfy the LOP.
The next result states a converse to proposition 8, and shows that assumption (A1)
characterizes exactly the set of (non decreasing) transaction costs specifications that
restore price uniformity in any monetary market game.
Proposition 9. Assume that c ∈ C violates (A1). Then one can construct an economy
modelled as a market game admitting a c-robust equilibrium with price dispersion.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof. Violation of assumption (A1) implies either
that ∃q > 0, b > b′ > 0 with c (b, q) = c (b′, 0) or that ∃b > 0, q > q′ > 0 with
c (b, q) = c (0, q′). Both cases are symmetric; we consider the former. Let γ = c (b, q)
and F = [b′, b] × [0, q]. By the monotonicity of c, c (b′′, q′′) = γ ∀ (b′′, q′′) ∈ F . The
gist of the proof consists in exploiting this fact to construct (a market game and) a
dispersed price equilibrium that cannot be ‘destroyed’ by removing an agent’s wash-
sales. To simplify the proof, we assume that c (b′′, q′′) = 0 for any trade that is strictly
lower than a trade in F , that is c (b′′, q′′) = 0 ∀ (b′′, q′′) ∈ G = [0, b′) × [0, q].16 The
structure (agents, markets and type of trades) of the example is the same as that of
example 1 below. Let F ′ =
[
b′ + b−b
′
4 , b− b−b
′
4
]
× [0, q2]. We proceed in three steps.
Step (i). We first claim that we can construct strategies satisfying the FOCs (18) such
that
(
bkh, q
k
h
) ∈ F ′ and (bkh − pkqkh, 0) ∈ F ′ for any trades conducted by agents α and β,
and
(
bkh, q
k
h
) ∈ G for any trades conducted by agents 0 and 1. Indeed, for any δ > 0 we
can find strategy profiles satisfying the relevant equations and implying price dispersion
with wash-sales “as small as required” in the sense that 0 < q
k
h
Qk
< δ for h = α, β.17 This
class of examples is such that as that δ → 0, (a) pspr → 1 (price dispersion vanishes), (b)
qr1
Qr and
bs1
Bs→ 0 (agent 1 vanishes) and, (c) b
r
α
Br ,
bsα
Bs ,
brβ
Br and
bsβ
Bs → 12 . Now, inspection
of Eq. (18) shows that for any
(
λr, λs, λb, λq
) ∈ IR4++, the strategy profile defined
by
(
λrλbbrh, λ
rλqqrh, λ
sλbbsh, λ
sλqqsh
)
also satisfies the FOCs. Using these 4 degrees of
freedom, and choosing δ > 0 small enough, one can find σ∗ satisfying the FOCs such
that any trade by agents 0 and 1 are in G, any trade by agents α and β are in F ′, and
the equivalent trades without wash-sales, (brα − prqrα, 0) and
(
bsβ − psqsβ, 0
)
are also in
F ′. (To see this, note that one can choose λs and λr s.t. Bs = Br = b
′+b
2 , and then
pick λq such that Qs and Qr ≤ q2 . This normalization delivers the required condition
for actual trades for δ small enough; that the equivalent no wash sales trades for α and
β are also in F ′ follows from the fact that wash-sales become as small as required).
For any h, we denote by σ¯∗h ∈ S¯h the strategy obtained by removing wash-sales from
16The rationale for this simplification is that this amounts to allowing for the maximum economies
on transaction costs that can be realised with trades below F , which should enlarge the set of potential
profitable deviations when transaction costs are positive.
17We have constructed a Mathematica spreadsheet that gives us such a strategy profile with price
dispersion for any small δ.
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σ∗h. Step (ii). Given σ
∗, one can easily find utility functions and endowments such that
all FOCs (18) are satisfied, and no endowment constraint binds. Further, the utility
functions can be taken to be strictly increasing and concave. Step (iii). To conclude, we
claim that σ∗ is indeed c-robust. Assume the contrary. This implies in particular that
there exists 1 > η¯ > 0 such that for any 0 < η < η¯, σ∗ is not a NE of Γηc (Otherwise,
one could use {nσ} ≡ {σ∗} to approach σ∗). Consider the sequence {ηn} ≡ {(η¯)n}.
Then for any n > 1, there exists h ∈ H (h may depend on n) with a deviation nσˆh s. t.
ηn {TC (σ∗h)− TC (nσˆh)} > uh
(
σ∗h, σ
∗
−h
)− uh (nσˆh, σ∗−h) ≥ 0, (16)
where TC (σh) stands for the total transaction cost of σh. W.l.o.g. we can take the
deviations to be without wash-sales, that is nσˆh ∈ S¯h. Using the finiteness of H and
the compacteness of S¯h, one can find an invariant agent h′ and extract a subsequence
{n′ σˆh′}n′∈IN that converges to a limit σˆ∗h ∈ S¯h. It follows from (16) that uh′
(
σˆ∗h, σ
∗
−h
)
=
uh′
(
σ∗h, σ
∗
−h
)
, viz σˆ∗h ∈ S¯h is a best reply to σ∗−h; the unicity result derived in lemma 5
(appendix B) then implies that σˆ∗h = σ¯
∗
h. The properties of σ
∗
h and σ¯
∗
h therefore imply
that if h′ ∈ {α, β} , TC
(
n′ σˆh′
)
= γ = TC
(
σ∗h′
)
for n′ large. But then, the strict
inequality in (16) cannot be satisfied along the sequence {n′ σˆh′}n′∈IN , a contradiction.
A similar contradiction results if h′ ∈ {0, 1} under our simplifying assumption on the
behavior of c in G.18
As an illustration, it is useful to apply those results to the special but important
class of fixed cost specification.19 Formally, consider c ∈ C such that
c (b, q) = γbq · 1{(q,b)>0} + γb · 1{b>0} + γq · 1{q>0}, (17)
with 1X the indicator function of X, and (γbq, γb, γq) ∈ R3+. In that case, assumption
(A1) amounts to γb > 0 and γq > 0. Proposition 8 then implies that, under a fixed cost
specification our result hold as one would expect when agents face a cost to initiate
trade on each side of the market:
Corollary 10. Let c be of the fixed cost form (17) with γb > 0 and γq > 0. Then any
c-robust equilibrium of Γ satisfies the LOP.
On the other hand, a ‘participation cost’ specification, in which agents simply pay
a cost to participate to the market (γb = γq = 0), does not eliminate price dispersion.
Indeed, the ‘participation cost’ case corresponds to the most extreme violation of (A1),
18This simplification allows us to use σ∗ as a candidate equilibrium when η > 0 is sufficiently small.
More generally, σ∗ would be approached by a sequence with nσ∗ 6= σ∗. For a fixed c, and given utility
functions derived in step (ii), the relevant sequence can be numerically computed (as a function of η) if
the behavior of c in G is sufficiently regular (say, satisfying the property that the set of points in [0, b′]
where c (., 0) is not derivable, and the set of points in [0, q] where c (0, .) is not derivable, are finite).
19We thank the associate editor and a referee for suggesting this discussion.
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and is the only specification that virtualy does not eliminate (in the limit) any equilib-
rium of any market game.20 Finally, one may ask what happens for the intermediate
case in which agents face a fixed cost on only one side of the market (γb > 0 = γq or
γq > 0 = γb). Such a specification will eliminate some dispersed prices equilibria of
some market games. For instance, this would eliminate the dispersed prices example
in [5] and [23]. However, as example 1 in section 5.1 makes clear, it will not eliminate
price dispersion for all market games. One conclusion to draw from this discussion is
that it is sufficient for our results that there is a cost associated with each ‘side’ of
the market. This seems (to us) a reasonable characterization of many trade activities.
For instance, in financial markets, there is typically a positive cost—e.g., time cost or
communication cost—associated with each order. Even with search costs, a fixed cost
may be incurred to carry on two transactions.
To conclude, we discuss the generality of theorem 3. While the proof provided in
appendix A hinges on the linearity assumption—essentially to construct the required
sequence of NE for any trading structure once such a sequence is given for one trading
structure—we conjecture that the irrelevance of the number of posts remains valid
under general specifications satisfying (A1). This is based on the observation that any
(c-)robust equilibrium for a given number of posts is a NE without wash-sales and as
such can be associated with a NE without wash-sales of the associated game with a
different number of posts.21 However, there is no straightforward way to prove this
conjecture (especially without imposing strong restrictions on the fundamentals of the
economy). Here, we extend theorem 3 to a weakened form of the linear specification,
and to the ‘two sided’ fixed costs specification:
Theorem 11. Assume one of the following cases
1. Total costs have the ‘commodity-wise linear’ form Σi∈ICi
(
Σkqi,k,Σkbi,k
)
, where
∀i, Ci (., .) is non decreasing, and strictly increasing in (at least) one argument.
2. All uh are concave, and transaction costs have the fixed cost specification (17)
with γb.γq > 0.
Then the number of trading posts is irrelevant for robust allocations.
Proof. Case 1 follows from the proof of theorem 3 since that proof only uses deviations
for which the total bids and offers for a given commodity (and hence costs) are constant
and the fact that robust equilibria satisfy the LOP. Case 2 is a corrolary of the general
claim, established in appendix B, that under this specification any σ ∈ NE (Γ) without
wash-sales is c-robust.
20To be precise, one can easily show that if c ∈ C does not eliminate any NE of any economy,
then c (b, q) = c (0, 0) · 1{(q,b)>0}. Conversely, for any c ≡ γ · 1{(q,b)>0}, if all uh are concave it is a
straightforward exercise to show that if a NE σ is such uh (σ) > uh (eh) ,∀h, then σ is c-robust.
21There is no clear reason why the robustness property should be affected by the number of posts.
Indeed, using simple examples with convex and concave costs, we have not been able to provide a
counterexample to this conjecture.
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The specifications covered by theorem 11 are reasonable, though more restrictive
than those satisfying (A1). In particular, case 1 covers some type of commodity-specific
transport costs, or an interest rate that varies with the total amount of money borrowed.
On the other hand, as noted above, case 2 would be relevant for trade activities in which
a fixed cost is borne for each transaction.
4.2. On transaction costs and price dispersion (the perturbed games)
Propositions 8 and 9 show that (A1) is sufficient and tight for price uniformity to
prevail as transaction costs vanish. For the linear case, proposition 1 stated a stronger
(and potentially surprising) result: the law of one price holds even for non negligible
costs. This specific result does not extend to general transaction costs functions. In
brief, for a fixed c ∈ C satisfying (A1), agents may have no interest in arbitraging price
differences because of the transaction costs component of doing so. Hence, our analysis
is not in conflict with the conventional wisdom that transaction costs are a major source
of price dispersion.
This section provides a short discussion of this type of price dispersion. Precisely,
we present standard specifications that are inconsistent with price dispersion even when
costs are strictly positive. The results suggest that to serve as a source of price disper-
sion, transaction costs must depend in a complicated way on the agent’s position on
each side of the market. Note that this possible failure of the law of one price will be
driven merely by the presence of transaction costs and not by wash-sales. This implies
in particular that the extent of (potential) price dispersion is directly linked to the
magnitude of transaction costs, in the following sense:
Corollary 12. Fix c ∈ C satisfying (A1). Let pi > 0. Then ∃η¯ > 0 such that ∀η < η¯,
in any NE of Γηc price dispersion is bounded above by pi, that is
max
{s,r|pi,r>0,pi,s>0}
(
pi,s
pi,r
− 1
)
< pi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L} .
Proof. Follows from proposition 8.
With this in mind, consider first the case in which the transaction cost function c
depends only on one argument (either b or q). Condition (A1) then simply amounts to
assuming that c is strictly increasing. For this case, the law of one price holds not only
in the limit, but also for non negligible costs:
Proposition 13. Assume that TCs are given by c (q) or c (b) where c : R+ −→ R+ is
a strictly increasing function. Then the LOP holds for any equilibrium of Γηc (η > 0).
Proof. Similar to that of proposition 1
Note that no restriction are needed on the shape of c (.) aside from strict monotonic-
ity. In particular, this is compatible with the usual assumption of convex costs, but also
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with the presence of non-convexities (return to scale) in the transaction technology.22
Furthermore, transaction costs are not required to vary smoothly when the agent offer
(or, bid) vary. Hence (upward) jumps, or kinks in the cost function are allowed.
Consider now the case in which both buyers and sellers incur a transaction cost.
Proposition 1 can then be extended for the commodity-wise linear form and for the
two-sided fixed cost specification:
Proposition 14. Assume that transaction costs have either the commodity-wise linear
form of theorem 11, or the fixed cost specification (17) with γb.γq > 0. Then the LOP
holds for any equilibrium of Γηc (η > 0).
Proof. Direct adaptation of the proof of proposition 1.
Intuitively, those cases do not allow for dispersed prices because they have the prop-
erty that marginal transaction costs among the trading posts where one trades a given
commodity are necessarily equal. In contrast, two-sided transaction costs (satisfying
(A1)) could lead to price dispersion in the presence of non linearities. In that respect,
our emphasis on the robustness of the law of one price does not conflict with standard
theories stressing the role of transaction costs in explaining price dispersion. Indeed,
propositions 13 and 14 above yield the additional insight that, in the setup under study,
price dispersion requires both buyers and sellers to incur some (non linear) costs in their
trading activity.
5. Discussion
5.1. More on wash sales and price dispersion
The previous analysis underscores the important role of wash-sales. In this section
we provide two additional results to further our understanding of the connection be-
tween (the structure of) wash-sales and (the possibility of) price dispersion. The first
result shows that wash-sales on all trading posts are necessary for equilibrium price
dispersion; the second result shows that wash-sales on one side (buying or selling side)
are sufficient.
Proposition 15. Assume that there exists one active trading post for good i (say,
(i, n)) in which no agent simultaneously buy and sell. Then pi,k = pi,n for any active
post for good i.
Proof. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether there exists ∃s such that pi,s >
pi,n > 0, or ∃r such that pi,n > pi,r > 0. Consider first the latter case. Then, step 1
and 2 of theorem 1 apply (with (i, n) in place of (i, s)) as they only make use of the fact
22For instance a standard cost function covered by proposition 9 is c (0) = 0 and c (q) = γ + C (q)
for q > 0, where γ > 0 is a fixed cost and C (q) is increasing and convex.
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that there are no wash-sales on the post with the highest price. The result obtains for
this case. Consider now the case in which ∃s such that pi,s > pi,n > 0. By a reasoning
similar but symmetric to that in step 1, one can show that
Qi,sh
Qi,sh + q
i,s
h
<
Qi,nh
Qi,nh + q
i,n
h
∀h ∈ Q (i, n) .
Also, one can easily verify that the argument in step 2, with offers in place of bids and
(i, n) in place of (i, s), can be used to obtain a contradiction. The result follows.
The above result shows that equilibrium price dispersion requires not only that
(some) agents place wash sales on the trading posts with extreme prices, but also on
any active post. In that precise sense, there must be ‘a lot’ of wash sales to support non
uniform prices. Regarding the structure of transaction costs, one implication is that if
positive transaction costs (satisfying (A1)) are incurred on any single post, the law of
one price holds in the limit.
We now provide an example with dispersion in which wash-sales are placed on one
side of the market (here, net buyers). Regarding our robustness approach, this shows
that a specification in which one side but not the other incur a fixed cost to participate to
the market will not eliminate price heterogeneity. The example may be of independent
interest, as examples found elsewhere in the literature [e.g., 5, 23] involve wash-sales
on both sides of each trading posts, and leave open the question of the necessity of this
specific pattern.
Example 1. The example involves two goods {1, 2}, four agents H = {0, 1, α, β}, and
two trading posts/markets {r, s}. We consider a ‘barter’ market game, so that on each
post each good can be exchanged against the other. An agent thus solves
max(brh,qrh,bsh,qsh)∈Sh u
(
x1h, x
2
h
)
s.t.
x1h = e
1
h +
qrh
QrB
r − brh +
qsh
QsB
s − bsh
x2h = e
2
h +
brh
BrQ
r − qrh +
bsh
BsQ
s − qsh
where bkh (resp., q
k
h) is the quantity of good 1 (resp., good 2) put on post k. We further
specify u
(
x1h, x
2
h
)
= lnx1h + lnx
2
h ∀h ∈ H, and fix endowments
e0 =
(
2,
144
35
)
, e1 =
(
267
145
,
16
15
)
, eα =
(
9237
841
,
26161
5887
)
, eβ =
(
29227
8410
,
20918
12615
)
.
For this example, FOCs are sufficient and necessary for equilibrium (see for instance
[5]). They are given by
∂uh
∂x1h
/
∂uh
∂x2h
=
Bkh
Qkh
(
Qk
Bk
)2
=
Bkh
Bk
Qk
Qkh
1
pk
∀k = r, s ∀h ∈ H. (18)
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We claim that the following strategy profile forms an equilibrium with p
s
pr =
15
14 :
σ0 =
(
0,
5
7
, 0,
2
5
)
, σ1 =
(
7
29
, 0, 0,
1
15
)
,
σα =
(
5285
841
,
30
7
,
588
841
, 0
)
, σβ =
(
399
841
, 0,
1935
841
,
23
15
)
.
This yields aggregate bids and offers Br = 7, Qr = 5, Bs = 3, Qs = 2, prices pr =
7
5 < p
s = 32 , and final allocations
(
x10, x
2
0
)
=
(
18
5 , 3
)
,
(
x11, x
2
1
)
=
(
17
10 ,
34
29
)
,
(
x1α, x
2
α
)
=(
10, 4300841
)
and
(
x1β, x
2
β
)
=
(
3, 1680841
)
. To see that this forms a NE, one can check that
all first order conditions (18) are satisfied, and that no agent is constrained by his
endowment in equilibrium (i.e. brh + b
s
h < e
1
h and q
r
h + q
s
h < e
1
h for any h ∈ H). In this
equilibrium there is on each post one agent playing wash-sales: agent α on post r and
agent β on post s. Both agents are net buyers (of good 2), as brα − prqrα = 239841 > 0 and
bsβ − psqsβ = 78410 > 0.
5.2. More perturbations
Our robustness approach builds on one type of perturbation—transaction costs. One
may ask how our conclusions would be affected when considering different or additional
perturbations.23 We provide some insights into this issue here. One should keep in mind
though that the main point of the paper is not to discuss all types of perturbations, but
to stress that price dispersion is not robust to one particular, economically motivated
one.
One alternative approach is to weaken the (Nash) equilibrium concept, along the
lines of Radner’s [33] ε-Nash equilibrium, and see what happens when both perturba-
tions vanish. In the context of our framework, the ε-NE can be motivated as one way
to introduce some grain of bounded rationality. Formaly, define
Definition 4. An ε-Nash equilibrium σ of the game Γη is a strategy profile such that
no agent h ∈ H has a deviation σˆh ∈ Sh with uh (σˆh, σ−h) > uh (σh, σ−h) + ε.
Clearly, a robust equilibrium (in our sense) can still be attained as a limit of ε-NE.
This is true irrespective of the relative importance of transaction costs and maximizing
errors. The more relevant question is whether equilibria with wash-sales (and, poten-
tialy, dispersed prices) can be supported in the limit.
For general transaction costs satisfying (A1), the type of equilibria sustained de-
pends on the relative importance of transaction costs and maximizing errors as both
perturbations become small. For instance, if one allows maximizing errors to fall suf-
ficiently rapidly as transaction costs fall, only c-robust (without wash-sales) equilib-
ria will survive. In constrast, if departure from perfect optimization are relatively
23We thank the associate editor for raising this relevant issue, and from suggesting the discussion
of ε-Nash equilibria.
23
more significant than transaction costs, equilibria with wash-sales will also be sus-
tained in the limit. To make the discussion more precise, fix a Nash equilibrium σ∗
of a game Γ, and a transaction cost function c satisfying (A1). Here, we further as-
sume to simplify that c is continuous. For an arbitrary strategy σh, let C (σh) de-
note the total normalized cost of σh, that is C (σh) =
∑
i,k c(b
i,k
h , q
i,k
h ), and define
C¯h (σ∗h) = C (σ
∗
h)− C (σ¯∗h), with σ¯∗h the strategy without wash-sales associated with
σ∗h.
24 One can interpret C¯h (σ∗h) as a measure of the cost of wash-sales in σ
∗
h. Note
that by definition C¯h (σ∗h) ≥ 0,∀h ∈ H, and that (since (A1) holds) the equilibrium σ∗
is without wash-sales if and only if maxh∈H{C¯h (σ∗h)} = 0. We expect equilibria with
more costly wash-sales—higher value of maxh∈H{C¯h (σ∗h)}—to be less easily supported.
To account for the presence of both perturbations, we use sequences {εn, ηn}n∈IN such
that εn, ηn > 0, limn→∞ εn = limn→∞ ηn = 0, and limn→∞ εn/ηn ∈ IR+ ∪ {∞} exists.
The next result provides some restrictions on how transaction costs and maximizing
errors must behave for σ∗ to be approximated by εn-NE of the perturbed games Γηnc.
Proposition 16. Let σ∗ be a NE of Γ, and c a continuous transaction cost function
satisfying (A1). Then (i) σ∗ cannot be approached by any sequence of εn-NE of the
perturbed games Γηnc if limn→∞ εn/ηn < maxh∈H{C¯h (σ∗h)} . (ii) σ∗ is approachable by
a sequence of εn-NE of the perturbed games Γηnc if limn→∞ εn/ηn > maxh∈H{C (σ∗h)} .
Proof. See the appendix.
One implication of proposition 16 is that only c-robust equilibria survive when
limn→∞
nε
nη = 0 , while any Nash equilibrium of Γ survives when limn→∞
nε
nη is suffi-
ciently large.25
Another way to allow for bounded rationality, and to perturb the initial game, is
to introduce complexity costs directly on strategies (see, e.g., [10]). In our setup, one
could measure the complexity of a (market) strategy by the number of (market) orders
required to implement it. Formally, let γ (σh) = γ.# (σh), where γ > 0, and # (σh)
denotes the number of strictly positive elements in σh. If such complexity costs are the
only perturbation, it is easily seen that wash-sales will be eliminated, and that the law
of one price will be restored in the limit. (To see this, note that this case is formally
equivalent to the fixed cost specification in (17) with γbq = 0 and γb = γq = γ). The
same conclusion obtains if complexity costs and transaction costs are jointly considered,
irrespective of the relative importance of both type of perturbations:
Proposition 17. Fix c ∈ C satisfying (A1). Let σ∗ be a NE of Γ that can be ap-
proximated by a sequence of NE of perturbed games with transaction costs and with
24Formally,
(
bˆi,kh , qˆ
i,k
h
)
=
(
bi,kh − pi,kqi,kh , 0
)
whenever bi,kh ≥ pi,kqi,kh (net buyer on post (i, k)), and(
bˆi,kh , qˆ
i,k
h
)
=
(
0, qi,kh − bi,kh /pi,k
)
otherwise (net seller).
25This is not surprising. Our approach provides a way to reduce the set of potential equilibrium
outcomes, by breaking indifference in the agents’ best replies. The -NE, on the contrary, can potentialy
enlarge the set of equilibria. As more weight is put on the latter than the former in the limit argument,
more equilibria can be sustained.
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γn-complexity costs. Then σ∗satisfies the LOP.
This shows that our approach is robust to some alternative or additional perturpa-
tions. Now, if in turn both complexity costs and maximizing errors are considered, the
outcome depends on the relative importance of both type of pertubations. Note that
the results obtained for this case are sharper than, but qualitatively similar to, those
of proposition 16.
Proposition 18. Let uh be concave. (i) If limn−→∞ εnγn < 1, no equilibrium with wash-
sales is approachable by a sequence of εn-NE of the perturbed games with γn-complexity
costs, while any equilibrium without wash-sales is approachable. (ii) If limn−→∞ εnγn > 1,
any NE in which any agent places wash-sales on at most (one side of) one market is
approachable. (iii) More generally, any NE in which any agent places wash-sales on
at most m (≤ 2K) sides of trading posts is approachable if limn−→∞ εnγn > m. (In
particular, any NE is approachable if limn−→∞ εnγn > 2K).
Proof. See the appendix.
Regarding the distribution of prices, one conclusion to draw from the above discus-
sion is that the law of one price is more likely to hold when transaction (or, complexity)
costs are more significant than departure from full optimizing behavior. On the other
hand price dispersion may arise if maximizing errors are large relative to other type of
perturbations.26 Note however that equilibria without wash-sales—a subset of the equi-
libria satifying the law of on price—are robust irrespective of the relative importance
of all the above pertubations.
More generally, the original market game setup can be perturbed in many directions.
As suggested by the above discussion, wash-sales (and price dispersion) will be preserved
by some type of perturbations, and eliminated by others.27 Now, if one requires a
candidate equilibrium to be robust to any admissible perturbation (e.g., in the spirit
of the strategic stability of [22]), one may conclude that price dispersion is not a very
robust property.
6. Concluding remarks
The present paper introduces a natural approach to restricting the set of equilibria in
a market game, by requiring equilibria to be robust to arbitrarily small transaction costs.
In the context of (two versions of) the multiple trading posts variant of the canonical
market game, we show that price uniformity holds in any equilibrium satisfying the
requirement. In short, the failure of the law of one price—emphasized by [25, 23]—is
not very robust.
26For contributions who focus on bounded rationality to explain price dispersion, see [4, 43].
27One interesting and open research question is how the introduction of “trembles” would affect
equilibrium strategies and outcomes.
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Our results may be used in assessing the usefulness of the multiple trading posts
variant, as opposed to the canonical, single trading post market game. In this re-
spect, we suggest the following interpretation. In some sense, the multiple trading
posts variant might be seen as a generalization of the canonical market game. How-
ever this generalization might be misleading, in that its unique impact is to give rise
to unreasonable equilibria (in the precise sense that all “new” equilibria are killed by
the introduction of arbitrarily small transaction costs). This suggests that, without
additional assumptions, there is no loss of generality in working with the single trading
post version in which the law of one price is posited.
At this point, it is worth stressing that our results do not diminish the importance
of the contribution of [23, 24]. Rather, one possible conclusion of the current paper is
that more research is needed for the multiple post market game to offer a convincing
and separate explanation for price dispersion. We believe in particular that introducing
market manipulation considerations in this framework may shed light on some devia-
tions from the law of one price that arise in integrated and well organized markets
and cannot easily be explained by informational or search frictions, such as the well
documented persistent price divergence between identical, ‘twin-securities’ [37, 42].
More generally, the approach also has implications for the canonical market game.
In essence, only equilibria in which agents do not place wash sales trades should be
robust. The analysis of the structure of the set of robust equilibria is the subject of
future research. An interesting result is that the indeterminacy result of Peck et al.
[31], obtained for interior Nash equilibria, does not extend to robust equilibria.28
A. Proof of proposition 3
We first introduce additional notations to make explicit the dependence on the
number of trading posts. To this end, denote K =
(
K1, . . . ,KL
) ∈ INL+. Further
define, in strategy space,
NEη (K) = set of equilibria of ΓKη ,
NE (K) = set of equilibria of ΓK,
RE (K) = subset of NE (K) that are robust,
and, in allocation space,
NAη (K) =
{
x ∈ IRLH+ | ∃σ ∈ NEη (K) x = x (σ)
}
,
NA (K) =
{
x ∈ IRLH+ | ∃σ ∈ NE (K) x = x (σ)
}
,
RA (K) =
{
x ∈ IRLH+ | ∃σ ∈ RE (K) x = x (σ)
}
,
where x (σ) :=
(
xih (σ)
)
. Proposition 3 then rewrites:
Proposition 19. Let K′,K ∈ INL+. Then RA (K′) = RA (K) .
28We investigate this, and the issue of existence of a robust equilibrium in a companion paper [7].
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We first show the following intermediate result.
Lemma 4. Let η > 0 and K′,K ∈ INL++. Then NAη (K′) = NAη (K).
Proof. (By induction and permutations), it is sufficient to prove the result for the
case K =
(
K1 − 1,K2, . . . ,KL) and K′ = (K1, . . . ,KL). First note that NAη (K′) ⊇
NAη (K) because one can always add an inactive post. Hence, we need to show that
NAη (K′) ⊆ NAη (K). Fix an allocation x ∈ NAη (K′), and let σ′ ∈ NEη (K′) be one
equilibrium such that x = x (σ′). W.l.o.g. we assume that all (1, s) posts are active
at σ (otherwise, a mere permutation in the label of posts is sufficient). Consider the
strategy profile σ∈S (K) constructed from σ′ by transferring all trades posted on post
(1,K1) to post (1, 1) :(
b1,1h , q
1,1
h
)
=
(
b′1,1h + b
′1,K1
h , q
′1,1
h + q
′1,K1
h
)
, (19)(
bi,sh , q
i,s
h
)
=
(
b′i,sh , q
′i,s
h
)
∀h ∀ (i, s) 6= (1, 1) . (20)
We claim that σ is an equilibrium and that it implements x. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1. We first check that σ leads to the final allocation x. First note that by theorem
1, σ′ satisfies the LOP, so that
p′1,1 =
B
′1,1
Q′1,1
=
B
′1,K1
Q′1,K1
= p′1,K1 . (21)
Prices induced by σ are thus given by
pi,s =
B′i,s
Q′i,s
= p′i,s ∀ (i, s) 6= (1, 1) , (22)
p1,1 =
B′1,1 +B′1,K1
Q′1,1 +Q′1,K1
= p′1,1 = p′1,K1 , (23)
where the last equality follows from (21). One can easily check using (22) and (23)
that the strategy profile σ satisfies all the relevant constraints, and that x (σ) = x (σ′) .
Step 2. We now show that σ ∈ NEη (K). Assume the contrary. Then there exists
one agent, say h, and one deviation σˆh∈Sh (K) such that uh (σˆh, σ−h) > uh (σh, σ−h).
We shall use σˆh to construct a profitable deviation σˆ′h to the equilibrium σ
′. Define
σˆ′h∈Sh (K′) by (
bˆ′1,1h , qˆ
′1,1
h
)
=
(
τbbˆ
1,1
h , τq qˆ
1,1
h
)
, (24)(
bˆ′1,K1h , qˆ
′1,K1
h
)
=
(
(1− τb) bˆ1,1h , (1− τq) qˆ1,1h
)
, (25)(
bˆ′i,sh , qˆ
′i,s
h
)
=
(
bˆi,sh , qˆ
i,s
h
)
∀h ∀ (i, s) 6= (1, 1) , (1,K1) , (26)
where the weights τb and τq are given by
τb =
B′1,1h
B′1,1h +B
′1,K1
h
, τq =
Q′1,1h
Q′1,1h +Q
′1,K1
h
. (27)
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To show that σˆ′h is feasible and yields the same allocation as σˆh, we first compare prices.
In view of (26), we have pˆ′i,s = pˆi,s ∀ (i, s) 6= (1, 1) , (1,K1). Using successively Eq.
(24)-(25), Eq. (27) and the definition of σ, the price on post (1, 1) can be computed as
pˆ′1,1 = bˆ
′1,1
h +B
′1,1
h
qˆ′1,1h +Q
′1,1
h
= τbbˆ
1,1
h +B
′1,1
h
τq qˆ
1,1
h +Q
′1,1
h
= τbτq
bˆ1,1h +B
′1,1
h +B
′1,K1
h
qˆ1,1h +Q
′1,1
h +Q
′1,K1
h
= τbτq
bˆ1,1h +B
1,1
h
qˆ1,1h +Q
1,1
h
= τbτq pˆ
1,1.
(28)
Similarly, on post (1,K1) :
pˆ′1,K1 =
1− τb
1− τq pˆ
1,1. (29)
Now, to see that σˆ′h is feasible, compute
Dh
(
σˆ′h, σ
′
−h
)−Dh (σˆh, σ−h) = qˆ1,1h pˆ1,1 − qˆ′1,1h pˆ′1,1 − qˆ′1,K1h pˆ′1,K1 = 0,
where the last equality follows from (24)-(25) and (28)-(29). To see that σˆ′h yields the
same allocation as σˆh, we simply need to compute
x1h
(
σˆ′h, σ
′
−h
)− x1h (σˆh, σ−h) = bˆ′1,1hpˆ′1,1 + bˆ
′1,K1
h
pˆ′1,K1
− bˆ
1,1
h
pˆ1,1
= 0
by (24)-(25) and (28)-(29). Hence, we have that uh
(
σˆ′h, σ
′
−h
)
> uh
(
σ′h, σ
′
−h
)
, contra-
dicting the fact that σ′ ∈ NEη (K′). Thus, σ ∈ NEη (K).
We now prove the result. Let x ∈ RA (K). There exists σ ∈ RE (K) with x (σ) = x
and a sequence {nη,n σ} converging to (0, σ) with nσ ∈ NEnη (K). Lemma 4 implies
that for any n, there exist nσ′ ∈ NEnη (K′) such that x (nσ′) = x (nσ). Now, any
nσ′ might be viewed as an element of the compact set S¯ (K′). Compactness implies
that the sequence {nσ′}∞n=1 contains a subsequence {zσ′}∞z=1 which converges to an
element σ′ of S¯. By continuity, (i) uh
(
., σ′−h
)
is maximized for σ′h for any h, so that
σ′ ∈ NE (K′), and, (ii) x (σ′) = limz→∞ x (zσ′) = limz→∞ x (zσ) = x. Further, by
construction σ′ ∈ RE (K′), whence x ∈ RA (K′). This terminates the proof.
B. Proof of theorem 11 (case 2)
We first show that under concave preferences, any trading post on which one agent
participates is ‘essential’.
Lemma 5. Let uh be concave. Fix σ−h. Then there exists a unique best reply σ¯∗h ∈ S¯h.
Further, there exists a constant ρ > 0 such that ∀σ¯h ∈ S¯h, if there exists a trading post
(i, k) with the property that b¯∗i,kh > 0 while b¯
i,k
h = 0, or q¯
∗i,k
h > 0 while q¯
i,k
h = 0, then
uh (σ¯h, σ−h) < uh (σ¯∗h, σ−h)− ρ.
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Proof. We first show that σ¯∗h is unique. Assume that there exists two best replies with-
out wash sales, σ¯h 6= σ¯′h. Let σˆh = 12 σ¯h+ 12 σ¯′h. Note that σˆh is feasible by the feasability
of σ¯h and σ¯′h. For any post (i, k), denote by χ
i,k (σh) the contribution of the trade in
that post to h’s allocation, and by ∆i,k (σh) the contribution to h’s money holdings.
Note that xih (σh, σ−h) = e
i
h +
∑
k χ
i,k (σh), and that Dh (σh, σ−h) =
∑
(i,k) ∆
i,k (σh).
Further, Dh (σ¯h, σ−h) = Dh (σ¯′h, σ−h) = 0 since σ¯h 6= σ¯′h are best replies. We claim
that Dh (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 0 and xih (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 12xih (σ¯h, σ−h) + 12xih (σ¯′h, σ−h) ∀i, with at
least one inequality strict. To show this, we distinguish several cases depending on h’s
position on each active trading post.
Case 1 : b¯i,kh = b¯
′i,k
h = 0. Then
χi,k (σh) =
1
2
q¯i,kh +
1
2
q¯′i,kh =
1
2
χi,k (σ¯h) +
1
2
χi,k
(
σ¯′h
)
, (30)
∆τ (σˆh) =
1
2 q¯
i,k
h +
1
2 q¯
′i,k
h
Qi,kh +
(
1
2 q¯
i,k
h +
1
2 q¯
′i,k
h
)Bi,kh ≥ 12∆i,k (σ¯h) + 12∆i,k (σ¯′h) . (31)
Case 2. b¯i,kh > 0 and b¯
′i,k
h > 0. Then
χi,kh (σˆh) =
1
2 b¯
i,k
h +
1
2 b¯
′i,k
h
Bi,kh +
(
1
2 b¯
i,k
h +
1
2 b¯
′i,k
h
)Qi,kh ≥ 12χi,k (σ¯h) + 12χi,k (σ¯′h) , (32)
with strict inequality whenever b¯i,kh 6= b¯′i,kh , and
∆i,k (σˆh) = −12 b¯
i,k
h −
1
2
b¯′i,kh =
1
2
∆i,k (σ¯h) +
1
2
∆i,k
(
σ¯′h
)
. (33)
Case 3. b¯i,kh > 0 and b¯
′i,k
h = 0 (and symmetricaly for b¯
i,k
h = 0 and b¯
′i,k
h > 0). Then,
χi,k (σh) =
1
2 b¯
i,k
h
Bi,kh +
1
2 b¯
i,k
h
Qi,kh +
1
2
q¯′i,kh >
1
2
χi,k (σ¯h) +
1
2
χi,k
(
σ¯′h
)
, (34)
∆τ (σˆh) = −12 b¯
i,k
h +
1
2 q¯
′i,k
h
Qi,kh +
1
2 q¯
′i,k
h
Bi,kh ≥
1
2
∆i,k (σ¯h) +
1
2
∆i,k
(
σ¯′h
)
. (35)
(Inequalities (31)-(32) follow from the strict concavity, and (34)-(35) from the strict
monotonicity, of f : x 7→ xA+xB over IR+ (A,B > 0)). Summing (31), (33) and (35) over
all trading posts, one getsDh (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 12Dh (σ¯′h, σ−h)+ 12Dh (σ¯′h, σ−h) = 0. Summing
(30), (32) and (34) over posts for a given good, one gets
∑
k χ
i,k (σˆh) ≥ 12
∑
i χ
i,k (σ¯h)+
1
2
∑
i χ
i,k (σ¯′h) and eventualy x
i
h (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 12xih (σ¯h, σ−h) + 12xih (σ¯′h, σ−h). Now, one
can easily see that there must exist al least one (i, k) ∈ K s.t. either ∆i,k (σˆh) >
1
2∆
i,k (σ¯h) + 12∆
i,k (σ¯′h) or χ
i,k (σˆh) > 12χ
i,k (σ¯h) + 12χ
i,k (σ¯′h), for otherwise the only
cases are case 1 with q¯i,kh = q¯
′i,k
h and case 2 with b¯
i,k
h = b¯
′i,k
h , implying σ¯h = σ¯
′
h. Hence,
as claimed, Dh (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 0 and xih (σˆh, σ−h) ≥ 12xih (σ¯h, σ−h) + 12xih (σ¯′h, σ−h) ∀i,
with at least one inequality strict. But this implies that there exist a feasible deviation,
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σˆ′h resulting in an allocation x
i
h (σˆ
′
h, σ−h) ≥ 12xih (σ¯h, σ−h) + 12xih (σ¯′h, σ−h) with at least
one strict inequality. Using the strict monotonicity and the concavity of uh, we get
uh
(
σˆ′h, σ−h
)
> uh
(
1
2
xih (σ¯h, σ−h) +
1
2
xih
(
σ¯′h, σ−h
)) ≥ uh (σ¯h, σ−h) .
This contradicts the assumed optimality of σ¯h.
We now prove the rest of the lemma. For any two subsets (κb, κq) ∈ P (K)2 of
existings posts, we let S¯(κb,κq)h be the subset of strategies in S¯h for which h is constrained
not to buy on trading posts in κb and not to sell on posts in κq. By a reasoning
analogous to the above, one can show that max
S¯
(κb,κq)
h
uh (σh, σ−h) is attained for a
unique strategy, that we denote σ¯∗h (κb, κq). Now, as S¯h ≡ ∪(κb,κq)∈P(K)2S¯
(κb,κq)
h , agent
h’s maximisation program can be expressed as
max
(κb,κq)∈P(K)2
uh (σ¯∗h (κb, κq) , σ−h) .
The claim then easily follows from the finitess of P (K)2 and the unicity of σ¯∗h.
One consequence of lemma 5 is that any σ¯∗ ∈ NE (Γ)∩ S¯ is c-robust. To show this,
it is sufficient to show that σ∗ ∈ NE (Γη) when η (> 0) is small enough. Assume the
contrary. Then, for η as small as needed, there exists an agent h and a deviation σˆh,
which w.l.o.g. can be taken without wash-sales, such that
η {TC (σ¯∗h)− TC (σˆh)} > uh
(
σ¯∗h, σ
∗
−h
)− uh (σˆh, σ∗−h) , (36)
where TC (σh) denotes the transaction cost of σh. In particular, (36) implies that
TC (σ¯∗h) > TC (σˆh), which given the cost specification implies the existence of a post
(i, k) satisfying the assumption of lemma 5 (otherwise, it is easily seen that TC (σ¯∗h) ≤
TC (σˆh)). Hence, the r.h.s. of (36) is superior to the constant ρ > 0; however the l.h.s.
can be made arbitrarily small for η small enough. As η can be taken as small as needed,
a contradiction results. This establishes the claim that σ¯∗ is c-robust.
Now, consider a c-robust equilibrium σ of a game Γ with an arbitrary number of
posts. By robustness, σ ∈ S¯ (K) and satifies the LOP. Hence, the strategy profile σ′
defined by
(
b′ih, q
′i
h
)
=
(
ΣKik=1b
i
h,Σ
Ki
k=1q
i
h
)
∀h, i is a NE of the game with one post per
good, which yields the same allocation (see the proof of lemma 4 above). Now, since
σ ∈ NE (Γ) ∩ S¯, by proposition 4 there is no h that buys and sells a given good at σ,
implying that σ′ is without wash-sales. Hence, σ′ is also robust. The result follows.
C. Proof of proposition 16
Proof. Formally, nσ∗ is an εn-NE of Γηnc if and only if for any h ∈ H and any σˆh ∈ Sh
u
(
σˆh,
n σ∗−h
)− ηnC (σˆh) ≤ u (nσ∗h, nσ∗−h)− ηnC (nσ∗h) + εn. (37)
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Claim (ii) simply follows from the fact that (under the condition stated) σ∗ itself is a
εn-NE with ηnc-transaction costs, for n sufficiently large. Using (37) for nσ∗h = σ
∗ and
rearranging, one need to check that ∀h ∈ H,
u
(
σˆh, σ
∗
−h
)− u (σ∗h, σ∗−h) ≤ ηnC (σˆh) + ηn(εnηn − C (σ∗h)
)
, ∀σˆh ∈ Sh. (38)
Now, the l.h.s is negative since σ∗ is a NE, and the r.h.s. is strictly positive for n
sufficiently large because limn→∞ εn/ηn > maxh∈H{C (σ∗h)} ≥ C (σ∗h). This proves
(ii). To prove (i), we proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists a sequence
{nσ∗}n∈IN of εn-NE of the perturbed games Γηnc converging to σ∗. This implies in
particular that, along the sequence, no agent h can increase his payoff by more than εn
by deviating to nσ¯∗h, the strategy without wash-sales associated to
nσ∗h. Using (37) for
σˆh =n σ¯∗h and rearranging, it holds that, ∀h ∈ H,
ηn
(
(C (nσ∗h)− C (nσ¯∗h))−
εn
ηn
)
≤ u (nσ∗h,n σ∗−h)− u (nσ¯h,n σ∗−h) = 0, (39)
where the last equality follows from the definition of nσ¯∗h. Now, one can easily see
from the formulae of nσ¯∗h that
nσ¯∗h → σ¯∗h as nσ∗h → σ∗h. Thus, by the continuity of c,
C (nσ∗h) − C (nσ¯∗h) → C¯h (σ∗h). Cond. (39) then implies that C¯h (σ∗h) < εn/ηn for n
sufficiently large. This holds ∀h ∈ H (a finite set), contradicting the assumption that
limn→∞ εn/ηn < maxh∈H{C¯ (σ∗h)}. The claim follows.
D. Proof of proposition 18
We first show that for m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2K}, any equilibrium σ∗ of Γ such that
maxh∈H {# (σ∗h)−# (σ¯∗h)} = m , where σ¯∗h is the strategy without wash-sales associ-
ated with σ∗h, is approachable when limn−→∞
εn
γn
> m. This will establish (iii), (ii), and
the second part of (i). The proof is by contradiction. Assume that limn−→∞ εnγn > m,
and that σ∗ cannot be approximated by any sequence {nσ∗}n∈IN of εn-NE of the games
with γn-complexity costs. In particular, there exists N such that ∀n ≥ N , σ∗ is not an
εn-NE of Γγn . (Otherwise, one can pick a subsequence {εn′ , γn′} and use {n′σ∗} ≡ {σ∗}
to approach σ∗). Hence ∀n ≥ N, ∃h (n) ∈ H,n σˆh(n) ∈ Sh(n) such that
u(nσˆh(n), σ
∗
−h(n))− γn#(nσˆh(n)) > u(σ∗h(n), σ∗−h(n))− γn#(σ∗h(n)) + εn.
W.l.o.g. we can take the deviations σˆh(n) to be without wash-sales. Since H is finite,
∃h′ ∈ H such that one can extract from {nσˆh(n)}n∈IN a subsequence {n′ σˆh(n′)}n′∈IN
with h(n′) = h′ ∀n′. Note that, by unicity of the limit, {εn′/ηn′}n′∈IN converges to
limn−→∞ εnγn . The (sub)sequence {n
′
σˆh′}n′∈IN satisfies
γn′#(σ∗h′)− γn′#(n
′
σˆh′)− εn′ > u(σ∗h′ , σ∗−h′)− u(n
′
σˆh′ , σ
∗
−h′) ≥ 0, (40)
31
where the last inequality in the first line follows from the fact that σ∗ ∈ NE (Γ).
Rearranging the l.h.s., cond. (40) implies that
γn′
(
#(σ¯∗h′)−#(n
′
σˆh′)
)
+
(
γn′
(
#(σ∗h′)−#(σ¯∗h′)
)− εn′) ≥ 0, (41)
The second term in the l.h.s. is strictly negative for n′ sufficiently large (say, n′ > N ′),
because #(σ∗h′)−#(σ¯∗h′) ≤ m < limn′−→∞ εn′γn′ = limn−→∞
εn
γn
. Cond. (41) thus implies
that #(σ¯∗h′) > #(
n′ σˆh′), or equivalently, #(σ¯∗h′) − 1 ≥ #(n
′
σˆh′) for n′ > N ′. Now, by
the compactness of Sh′ , {n′ σˆh(n′)}n′∈IN admits a converging subsequence, {n′′ σˆh′}n′′∈IN ,
converging to an element σˆh′ ∈ Sh′ . Being the limit of strategies without wash-
sales, σˆh′ is without wash-sales (see the proof of propostion 4). We next claim that
u(σˆh′ , σ∗−h′) = u(σ
∗
h′ , σ
∗
−h′) and that #(σ¯
∗
h′) ≥ #(σˆh′) + 1. The former follows from
letting n′ →∞ in (40). The latter follows from the observation that if a given element
of σˆh′ is strictly positive, the corresponding element in n
′′
σˆh′ is also strictly positive
for n′′ sufficiently large (otherwise, n′′ σˆh′ cannot converge to σˆh′), i.e., #(n
′′
σˆh′) ≥
#(σˆh′). Using #(σ¯∗h′)− 1 ≥ #(n
′′
σˆh′) (for n′′ large), this implies #(σ¯∗h′) ≥ #(σˆh′) + 1.
Thus, σˆh′ is without wash-sales, yields the same payoff as σ∗h′ but differs from σ¯
∗
h′ (as
#(σ¯∗h′) ≥ #(σˆh′) + 1). This contradicts the unicity of the best reply without wash-sales
established in lemma 5.
We now prove the first part of (i). Consider an equilibrium with wash-sales, σ∗.
Then ∃h′, i, k such that agent h′ buys and sells on post (i, k). Assume that σ∗ is
approachable by a sequence {nσ∗h′}. Then, ∀σˆh′ ∈ Sh′
u(σˆh′ ,n σ∗−h′)− γn#(σˆh′) ≤ u(nσ∗h′ ,n σ∗−h′)− γn#(nσ∗h′) + εn. (42)
Note that b∗kh′ q
∗k
h′ > 0 implies that
nb
∗k
h′
nqkh′ > 0 for n large, that is h
′ is also active
on both sides of (i, k) at nσ∗h′ . Now, define
nσ˜∗h′ as the strategy obtained from
nσ∗h′ by
removing wash-sales on post k only. Then either #(nσ˜∗h′) = #(
nσ∗h′)− 1, or #(nσ˜∗h′) =
#(nσ∗h′)− 2. Applying (42) to nσ˜∗h′ , one gets γn
(
#
(
nσ∗h′
)−# (nσ˜∗h′)) ≤ εn, implying
that 1 ≤ εn/γn for n sufficiently large. But this contradicts the assumption that
limn−→∞ εnγn < 1.
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